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We give a cheat sensitive protocol for blind universal quantum computation that is efficient in
terms of computational and communication resources: it allows one party to perform an arbitrary
computation on a second party’s quantum computer without revealing either which computation is
performed, or its input and output. The first party’s computational capabilities can be extremely
limited: she must only be able to create and measure single-qubit superposition states. The second
party is not required to use measurement-based quantum computation. The protocol requires the
(optimal) exchange of O(J log
2
(N)) single-qubit states, where J is the computational depth and N
is the number of qubits needed for the computation.
Blind computation allows one party (say Alice) who
has limited computational power, to use the computa-
tional resources of another party (say Bob), without re-
vealing which computation she performs, nor her input
and output data. As one expects, arbitrary blind compu-
tation is impossible using a classical computer [1]. Sur-
prisingly, arbitrary blind computation is instead possible
on a quantum computer [2–12], achieving unconditional
security premised only on the correctness of quantum
physics, similar to that achieved for quantum key dis-
tribution. Here we propose a blind universal computa-
tion protocol that is efficient in terms of communication
between Alice and Bob. Differently from previous pro-
posals [2–12] our scheme is based on a cheat-sensitive
strategy: Alice can detect whether a dishonest Bob is
trying to ascertain the computation she wishes to per-
form. Moreover, in contrast to the one-time-pad proto-
col of Childs [2], ours does not require the computational
qubits to be exchanged between Alice and Bob and, in
contrast to the BFK protocol [3], it does not require
measurement-based computation, but is described in the
circuit model. Our protocol requires only O(J log
2
N)
qubits to be exchanged between Alice and Bob (J the
computation depth, N the number of qubits required for
the computation), achieving an exponential gain in N in
communication complexity over previous protocols, that
require O(NJ) communication overhead. As in the pre-
vious schemes, Alice’s computational capabilities can be
extremely limited: she must only generate and measure
single-qubit states in the computational {|0〉, |1〉} or the
complementary {|±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2} bases.
The main idea is that Alice communicates to Bob the
gates that he needs to apply using a Quantum Private
Query (QPQ)-inspired protocol [13, 14]: she encodes this
information into a quantum register and she randomly
intersperses her communication with decoys [15]. Bob
must apply the gates blindly and send back her regis-
ter without extracting information from it. If he does
try to extract the information, Alice can detect this from
a single-qubit measurement of the decoy states she re-
ceived back and she can interrupt her computation. In
this way Bob can determine at most a constant number
of steps of the computation before Alice has a high prob-
ability of detecting that he his cheating. Asymptotically
in J , he thus obtains no information on her computation.
Moreover, it is easy for Alice to hide both her input data
(since the encoding of the input state is part of the com-
putation) and her output data (since she can instruct
Bob to make random flips of the output state bits prior
to the final measurement). Finally, by adapting the ap-
proach proposed in [3, 7, 11, 16], our scheme can allow
the computationally-limited Alice to test whether Bob is
performing the computation requested.
The protocol:— Bob controls a quantum computing
facility which includes a quantum memory M composed
of N qubits initialized in a fiducial state (say the vec-
tor |0〉⊗N ) and a set G of O(poly(N)) universal gates
he can apply to them. To fix the notation, we can as-
sume for instance that G contains G = N(N + 2) el-
ements including a Hadamard and a pi/8 gate for each
qubit and a C-NOT for each (ordered) couple of qubits
of M [17]. In this scenario, Alice can instruct him to
perform an arbitrary computation by telling him which
element of G he must apply at each step of the computa-
tion. For example, Alice can send a number n between
0 and G − 1, which Bob interprets in the following way:
0 to N − 1 means “act with a Hadamard gate on qubit
n”, N to 2N − 1 means “act with a pi/8 gate on qubit
n−N”, and any other number means “act with a C-NOT
gate using n1 as control and n2 as target”, where n1, n2
are such that n = n1N + n2 + 2N . For this code, she
needs a log2G ≃ O(log2N) bit register. She can thus in-
struct Bob to perform an arbitrary J-step computation
by giving him J log2G ≃ O(J log2N) bits. This commu-
nication cost is optimal, because a programmable quan-
tum computer requires a program register of dimension
at least as large as the number of possible computations
that it can perform [18] (since at each step Bob can apply
2one out of G possible gates, in our case such number is
indeed equal to GJ , which requires J log2G bits).
To achieve blind computation, Alice must intersperse
her instructions to Bob with decoy queries (we shall see
in the following that this can be done with a linear over-
head in terms of communication and size of the mem-
ory M). Namely, at each computational step, she sends
a register A of log
2
G ≃ O(log
2
N) qubits. This reg-
ister contains either a plain instruction for Bob or, at
random times, a quantum decoy. Plain instructions are
encoded by preparing A in a state |n〉A of the compu-
tational basis: for n ∈ {0, · · · , G− 1}, it indicates to
Bob that the n-th element Un of the set G must be ap-
plied to the memoryM. In contrast, quantum decoys are
prepared by creating superposition of instructions of the
form
∑
n∈D ηn|n〉A where D is a subset of {0, · · · , G− 1}
containing at least two elements, ηn ∈ {−1, 1} (for ease
of notation, normalizations are dropped). To do so, as in
the BB84 protocol [19], it is sufficient for Alice to initial-
ize her register A into factorized states where some of the
qubits are in the computational basis {|0〉, |1〉} while the
others are in the basis {|+〉, |−〉} (a task she can achieve
even with limited computational capabilities). For in-
stance, (in the simplified case of two-qubit register) she
can produce a quantum decoy where the instructions |n =
0〉A and |n = 2〉A are superimposed by sending the qubits
of A in the factorized state |+, 0〉A = |0, 0〉A+|1, 0〉A [20].
Since Alice is sending plain messages and decoys at
random, Bob cannot perform even partial measurements
in the computational basis without risking disrupting
the coherence of Alice’s superpositions. Still he can
use the register A (without measuring it) as a quan-
tum control to blindly trigger his operation on M e.g.
by employing a qRAM (quantum Random Access Mem-
ory) [21, 22]. Specifically, for each state |Ψ〉M of M and
|φ〉A =
∑
n αn|n〉A of A he performs the control-unitary
gate UBob =
∑
n |n〉〈n| ⊗ Un which yields the mapping
|φ〉A ⊗ |Ψ〉M −→
∑
n
αn|n〉A ⊗ Un|Ψ〉M . (1)
After this operation, Bob sends the register A back to
Alice. Alice now checks her decoys to verify that Bob,
when processing A, did not try to “read” its information
content. There are two possible cases: her decoys can be
unentangled from Bob’s qubits or they can be entangled.
Case (a): The first case happens whenever Alice’s de-
coy is a superposition of n, n′, n′′,..., such that
Un|Ψ〉M = Un′ |Ψ〉M = Un′′ |Ψ〉M = ... , (2)
(e.g. Alice, through the register |n〉A + |n′〉A, instructs
Bob to apply a pi/8 gate to a superposition of two qubits
of M which she knows are initially in |0〉). In this case,
if Bob follows the protocol, the final state of A andM is
factorized and the A register is unchanged, see Eq. (1).
In contrast, if Bob had measured the register A (or had
entangled it with an ancilla), the superposition will be
corrupted. Alice can exploit this to monitor Bob: she
measures the register he sent back (single-qubit mea-
surements suffice) and checks that the results match the
qubits she had sent Bob. If they do not match, the su-
perposition of one of her decoys was collapsed: she knows
that Bob is trying to find out the values encoded in her
registers and she stops the computation. Otherwise, she
can assume that Bob has not obtained information on
which computation she instructed him to perform. Alice
can easily enforce Eq. (2) by devoting a (random, secret)
subset of Bob’s memoryM to doing trivial operations on
decoy states (e.g. keeping some qubits in that subset in
a state |0〉 on which decoys composed of pi/8 gates and
C-NOTs act trivially, and other qubits in eigenstates of
the Hadamard, on which Hadamard decoys act trivially).
Case (b): The second case happens whenever Eq. (2) is
not satisfied and the register A becomes entangled with
Bob’s qubits [e.g. this could happen if Alice instructed
him to apply a Hadamard gate to an equally weighted
superposition of the two qubits initially in |0〉]. In this
case she may disentangle A from M by sending to Bob
a new instruction which undoes the previous transfor-
mation, and then she can measure the qubits of A and
check whether they match with her original decoy. For
most universal gate sets this can be easily done without
requiring nontrivial quantum processing by Alice: when
Un = U
†
n [e.g. for Hadamards and C-NOTs] she just
needs to send back to Bob the same register A she had
received from him, using it as a subsequent instruction
of the computation. For the pi/8 gates the same result
is obtained with 8 consecutive iterations. The need of
bouncing back the same register multiple times does not
weaken the security of the scheme. In fact, from Bob’s
point of view this is just equivalent to him seeing such
states for a longer time: any coherent cheating strategy
he can apply to the successive iterations of such states is
equivalent to a strategy that he applies the first time he
sees them. In other words, he does not gain any advan-
tage from the fact that Alice is sending them multiple
times. Bob may become entangled with Alice’s register
during the protocol, but, importantly, he must be dis-
entangled before Alice measures: he cannot retain any
information by the time the computation ends.
Summarizing, if Alice knows that the qubits she re-
ceived back from Bob are factorized from his computa-
tion qubits, she measures them and checks whether they
match the decoy state she had sent him. If, instead, she
does not know it, she bounces back to Bob the register A
(either twice or 8 times depending on the gates involved)
and then she measures it. If her measurements disagree
with the state she had originally sent him, she is cer-
tain that Bob is trying to extract information from her
queries. The protocol is summarized in table I.
Security analysis:— The protocol security is based on
the fact that Bob does not know whether each single reg-
31. Bob initializes his qubits in |0〉⊗N .
2.
jth computation step: Alice sends Bob a register A of
O(log
2
N) qubits. It (randomly) either contains the
qubit to which a gate is to be applied (e.g. |3〉A means
“apply the Hadamard gate to qubit #3”), or it contains
a decoy (e.g. |n〉A + |n
′〉A).
3.
Bob uses Alice’s register to establish to which qubits to
apply the gates of the universal set: e.g. Bob’s action
UBob|3〉A|Ψ〉M applies the Hadamard gate to Bob’s
qubit #3 (here |Ψ〉M represents the global state of
Bob’s qubits). If the register contains a decoy, he will
apply the gates to a superposition of registers.
4. Bob sends the register A back to Alice.
5.
If Alice knows that the register A is unentangled from
Bob’s qubits, she measures it [case (a), see text].
Otherwise she sends it back to Bob as one of the
successive instructions until it becomes unentangled,
and then measures it [case (b)]. If the measurement
result matches the state she had initially prepared, she
proceeds to the next step of the computation through
point 2, otherwise she halts the computation.
6.
At the end of the computation, Bob measures the
computation qubits and reveals the computation result
(possibly encrypted, see text).
TABLE I: Scheme of the protocol.
ister sent by Alice is a decoy or a plain instruction, and
these are encoded into states belonging to non-orthogonal
subspaces. (In this respect, it is important to notice that
already Alice’s first communication can contain a decoy
for all possible gates.) Accordingly, any information that
Bob extracts from the computational basis will disturb
the superpositions of the decoy states [23, 24], giving Al-
ice a nonzero probability of identifying his cheat. This
observation can be made rigorous by exploiting a formal
connection between our scheme and the BB84 quantum-
key-distribution protocol [19], whose security is well es-
tablished [25–28] also when significantly different proba-
bilities are assigned to the complementary coding bases
{|0〉, |1〉} and {|+〉, |−〉} [29]. Specifically, our protocol
can be recast as an instance of a (non-balanced [29])
BB84 where Alice sends a secret key to herself using Bob
as a quantum channel: she is transmitting and recover-
ing sequences of |0〉’s and |1〉’s (plain instructions) and
sequences of |0〉, |1〉, |±〉’s (decoys). Since Alice already
knows the key she is sending to herself, she can easily
determine whether Bob is disturbing the channel by try-
ing to read the key, i.e. by acquiring information on the
computation Alice wishes him to perform [the actions of
an honest Bob are carefully designed not to disturb the
key so that he will not be mistaken as a cheater]. Be-
cause of the formal mapping detailed above, the security
of the whole procedure is guaranteed by the security of
the BB84 protocol.
The probability that Bob can cheat for j computa-
tional steps without being detected by Alice decreases
exponentially as pγj , where γ is the average fraction of
instructions that are decoys and p is the probability of
being detected on a single decoy. So on average he can
cheat only for a constant number of steps before trigger-
ing Alice’s cheat detection. He will thus be able to obtain
information only on a constant fraction of Alice’s gates
before she stops the protocol: asymptotically in J he ob-
tains no information on Alice’s computation. In contrast
to the cheat-sensitivity of the QPQ or of the protocol of
[15], a cheating Bob cannot obtain the full information
here (strong cheat-sensitivity).
Resource accounting:— We now give a resource-
accounting of the protocol. As stated above, this pro-
tocol is optimal in terms of the number of exchanged
bits of information between Alice and Bob, as a univer-
sal quantum computer cannot have a software register
of less than O(J log2N) bits. The blind protocol simply
requires these to be qubits instead of bits and requires a
small overhead composed by the decoys and the final one-
time-pad encoding (see below). The total communication
complexity is then still O(J log
2
N) qubits. The running
time overhead will be linear (a constant fraction γ of the
operations will be decoy operations), so the algorithm
running time will be O((1 + γ)J). The fraction γ can be
chosen arbitrarily small for J →∞ as (ignoring logarith-
mic corrections) it can scale as J−1/2, see [29]. The over-
head in terms of qubits is linear: we need a constant frac-
tion λ of qubits to be devoted to Alice’s decoy operations,
so that the qubit cost goes from N to N(1+λ). In terms
of gates, there is no overhead with respect to what is nec-
essary for a universal programmable quantum computer
[18]. The only difference is that the software is encoded
in quantum bits (Alice’s register) instead of a sequence of
classical numbers. This means that Bob needs controlled-
swaps that are controlled by a quantum register instead
of a classical register that would be sufficient for a pro-
grammable quantum computer. Summarizing, except for
logarithmic or constant corrections, the blind computa-
tion protocol proposed here does not require a significant
computational or communication overhead over what is
necessary for a universal programmable quantum com-
puter: the only substantial difference is that the software
(Alice’s registers) is encoded in qubits instead of bits.
Add-ons:— In addition to guaranteeing the privacy of
Alice’s computation, our protocol ensures also privacy of
the input and output data. The protection of the input is
a trivial consequence of the fact that the preparation of
the initial state is included in the algorithm [remember
that Bob’s quantum computer starts from a fiducial state
e.g. |0〉⊗N ]. To protect the output Alice can instruct Bob
to perform random bit flips on the computation qubits
in the same basis on which he will perform the compu-
tation’s final measurement. This means that Bob’s out-
come will be randomized with a one-time-pad of which
only Alice has the key: it will be secure from anyone else.
4In the protocol described up to now Alice cannot ascer-
tain whether Bob is indeed performing the computation
she has requested. Even a non-cheating Bob could still be
uncooperative and perform a different computation. In-
terestingly, even though Alice has limited computational
capabilities, she can still check that Bob is cooperating
using the ideas of “interacting proofs” described in [16]
and adapted to blind computation in [3, 7, 11]. The ba-
sic idea is very simple: hidden in her computation, Alice
places some trap qubits. Since Bob does not know the
position of the traps, he will flip the trap qubits with high
probability if he does not follow Alice’s instructions. It
is also possible to use quantum error correction codes to
increase the probability that an uncooperative Bob flips
the trap [3, 7, 11, 16].
Conclusions:— We presented a scheme for performing
universal blind quantum computation where both Alice’s
algorithm and her input-output data are hidden from
anyone else. It is efficient in terms of communication and
computational resources. It is a cheat-sensitive scheme:
if Bob tries to extract information from Alice’s registers
or to perform a different computation, she can find it
out and stop the protocol before he gains a significant
fraction of the information on the computation.
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